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HUMANITIES AND MEDICINE
What Is Life? Prerequisites for a Definition
Douglas E. Dixa
Department ofBiology, University ofBiology, West Hartford, Connecticut
Biologists view life as transient while theologians see it as etetnal. An unbiased definitionfor life
would respect both views until one or both were eliminated by evidence. Thispaper identifies pre-
requisitesforsuch adefinition. Firstamong these is thatallassumptions be madeexplicit. Currently
"life" issurroundedby implicit assumptions, e.g., that it is what organisms lose at death or that it is
eternal, that its quality is inversely related topersonal distress, that it originatedsomefour billion
years ago, and that animate matter can be distinguishedfrom inanimate matter. None of these
assumptions aresupportedbydata. Itispossible therefore that "life" is asmeaningless asphlogiston.
Ilife has meaning, i.e., ifit is true, itmust be aspermanent as buoyancy, gravity, electricity, andthe
other truths ofnature. Any definitionforlife that wouldpennitsuch truth to be seen must befree of
unwarrantedassumptions. Forthemoment, atleast, such adefinition wouldneedtobelooselystructured
andbroadlyfocused. It wouldneedto describe the longandconvolutedprocess by which matterand
energyform organisms which then evolve toform conscious organisms which then explore nature
andeventually discover truth. Such a definition would include all the reactions and interactions of
matterandenergy andalltheaspects ofconscious discovery. Itwouldsufferfromsuperficiality, but,
bybeingfreefrom bias,provide afoundationfor dialogue between biologists and theologians.
INTRODUCTION AND METHOD
Life is common to the vocabulary of
two divergent disciplines: biology with its
focus on events before death, andtheology
with its focus on events after death. In
biology, life isassumed to betransient, i.e.,
the antonym of death. In theology, life is
assumedto be eternal. Whichassumptionis
valid? What, precisely, is life? Schrodinger
called attention to the need for definition,
butnevermeasured life, orevenspecified its
units ofmeasure [1]. Does lifecome in liters
orgrams orcalories? Isthe total amount of
life fixed orvariable, and, ifvariable, how
does it vary overtime and space, and from
one organism to another, and across the
different species? What amount of life
presently exists on Earth? Is there a rela-
tionship between this amount and the state
ofthe ecosystem, orthe health oforganisms,
or the number or rate ofbirths or deaths?
These are the kinds of questions that stu-
dents oflife should expect to pursue in life
science. But there are no answers and no
reasonable approaches to finding any. The




nothing but biochemistry [1, 4-7], i.e., the
"orderly and lawfuil behavior of matter"
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[1]. The evidence in support ofthis behav-
ioral perspective isthe apparentabsence of
any need to look beyond the ordinary laws
ofnature:
"No vital force, no soul...has come to
light or seems to be required to explain
biological phenomena" [8].
Without question, this behavioral per-
spective has been successful in explaining
biological phenomena. The problem is that
biological phenomena are transient, while
life, accordingtotheologians, isetemal. Itis
possible that the theologians are wrong, or
that the current perception of biological
phenomena is overly restrictive. Clearly,
however, there is no proofthat life is only
biochemistry, orthat it does ordoes not exist
beyond death. The need is for a definition
oflife that is free from bias. It is the pur-
pose ofthis paper to identify prerequisites
for such a definition by scrutinizing the
assumptions surrounding life. Ofnecessity,
this effort will be loosely structured and
broadly focused. It will encompass a wide
spectrum ofideas and suffer from superfi-
ciality. But, ifsuccessful, it will lay afoun-
dation for reasonable dialogue between
biologists and theologians and dispel the
illusion of opposition or incompatibility
between the two disciplines.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
1. The meaning oflife
What is life? "It is really impossible to
define life" [9]. "When reducedto honesty,
few will profess to know what life is, and
some will argue that the word is meaning-
less" [10]. It is possible that life is mean-
ingless, like the ether, phlogiston, andbodily
humors. But life has a venerable history
and is not easily dismissed. It is difficult
however to know where to begin in the
search for an unbiased definition.
Whatever we say of life is subjective
and implies an assumption. We can specify
neither life's properties nor its boundaries.
The prerequisites for an unbiased defini-
tion require that all assumptions be explicit.
Unfortunately, the assumption that life is
synonymous with animate behavior has
become so commonplace among scientists
that it is taken as fact. Consider, for exam-
ple, the newly deciphered "Book ofLife"
[11]. It is in fact the blueprint for human
protein synthesis. Is such information syn-
onymous with life? Possibly, but the case
awaits a definition. Until then, equating
genetic information with life begs the
question. This fallacy is common as is evi-
dent in work on various aspects ofanimate
behavior entitled the origin [12], history
[13], future [14], shape [15], diversity [16],
synthesis [17-18], complexity [19], path
[20], distribution [21], signs [22], color
[23], logic [5], or quality [24] oflife. And
it is most evident inthe common definition
of biology, the scientific study of organ-
isms, asthe "study oflife" or"life science"
[3]. The fallacy is incorporated into text-
books, e.g., "Life is notoriously hard to
define but we know it has certain proper-
ties" [25]. In fact we can't know life's
properties or even if life has properties.
Logic prevents us from knowing proper-
ties before we agree upon the definition.
After reviewing definitions for life,
Korzeniewski concludes that none "probe
into the very core of the essence of life"
[6]. He attempts to rectify this failing but
immediately assumes that life is identical
to aliving individual. Otherassumptionsare
equally plausible. For instance we might
assumethat life is thecollection ofall living
individuals over all time. The focus then
would be on evolution, and, despite the
current controversy betweenbiologists and
creationists, evolution began with a theo-
logical foundation [26].
At first glance, evolution can seem
progressive [26], fororganisms havechanged
overtime to become gradually more intelli-
gent. It is possible to imagine humans
using intelligence to control evolution,
e.g., colonizing space, adaptingthegenome
to the new environments, and, in this way,
inventing new species. And it is possibleDix: What is life? 315
that evolution will occur in just such a
manner. But it is also possible that humans
or their progeny will follow the dinosaurs
into extinction. Nothingprecludes evolution
from being cyclic with organisms changing
from simple to intelligent only to change
backto simple and thenagain to intelligent
repeatedly, and, possibly, forever. Cyclic
phenomena are common in nature, e.g.,
planets around the sun, moons around the
planets, electrons around the nucleus, the
precipitation and evaporation ofwater, the
circulation of blood and lymph, protein
turnover, glycolysis, respiration, reproduc-
tion, and electromagnetic radiation. If we
want anunbiased definition forlife, we can-
not assume that evolution is or is notcyclic.
If evolution is cyclic, we might say
intelligent organisms are more advanced
than simple organisms in the manner that
9:00 a.m. is more advanced than 8:00 a.m.
But that wouldn't imply that a change in
organisms fromsimpleto intelligent orvice
versa is improved anymore than would a
change intime. Evolutioncouldbeas much
a clock as is the rotation ofthe Earth.
Uncertainty is intrinsic to biological
explanations [27]. Chemical and physical
explanations employ objective definitions,
explicit assumptions, and quantitative
boundaries on time and space. And they
yield predictions, within calculable limits
ofuncertainty, ofhow the system in ques-
tion will change over time. Biological
explanations fail in these regards. Because
we lack evidence ofevolution ever having
run its course, the uncertainty in predic-
tions on how organisms will change is
boundless. We can't know ifevolution will
go to completion, orwhatcompletionmight
mean, orhowcloseto completion evolution
is now. We can't say whether evolution is
reversible orirreversible, cyclic ornon-cyclic.
Organisms prevail according to their
ability to reproduce, and it is common for
scientists to explain evolution in terms of
reproductive advantage. Butwhat,precisely,
does that mean? Ifreproductive advantage
were synonymous with kinetic advantage
on the approach to equilibrium or some
other goal, then we would understand
something of evolution. But we don't
know what, if anything, evolution is
approaching, and for that reason, "repro-
ductive advantage" is deceptive. It has the
feel ofan explanation, but doesn't convey
information. It simply states the obvious.
Some organisms prevail and some don't. To
say that those that prevail have the advan-
tage is to say nothing more than that they
prevail [28]. And organisms that prevail
today, may vanish tomorrow, or next year,
ornextmillennium. Speculating onevolution
is like articulating laws of kinetics after
watching only part of one reaction. If life
is related to evolution, we have little evi-
dence ofwhat it is. Guessing that it is mys-
tical or illusory is no less reasonable than
guessing that it isn't.
It is common for scientists to define
living systems interms ofreproduction [6],
or, moreprecisely, "thecapacitytobe at least
a partner in reproduction" [7]. But many
conspicuously living systems, e.g., children,
postmenopausal women, impotent men,
sterile organisms, etc., have no natural
capacity for participating in reproduction.
And senescence or mitotic inhibitors can
render organisms incapable ofparticipating
even in artificial forms of reproduction,
and yet such organisms are unanimously
recognized as alive. What is itabout repro-
ductively incompetent organisms that we
recognize as alive? I suggest it is the same
property that we recognize in fertile organ-
isms, notreproductive capacity, but autono-
mous homeostasis [29]. All animate matter,
and no inanimate matter, preserves some
aspect ofits internal environment constant
and in disequilibrium with its external
environment, and it doesthis autonomously.
Certain inanimate systems, e.g., refrigerators,
incubators, andclimate-controlled buildings,
do exhibithomeostasis, butthese inanimate
homeostatic systems are not autonomous.
Theyrequire activation byhumanoperators,
and, for this reason, are recognized as
inanimate.316 Dix: What is life?
It is common to think of life as what
organisms lose at death, or, in otherwords,
what distinguishes animate from inanimate
matter. From oldobservations, weknowthat
organisms lose no weight upon dying and,
therefore, life, by this definition, is imma-
terial [30]. Behavior is weightless and
homeostasis is a form ofbehavior [29]. It
is tempting to define homeostasis as life.
But that wouldbe abiased definition, forit
would imply assumptions onthe difference
between internal and external environ-
ments and the cause ofthat difference.
Imagine that a cell is animate because
it autonomously maintains disequilibria
across its membrane, e.g., the potassium
concentration is higher and the sodium
concentrationlowerintracellularlythanextra-
cellularly. In a similar manner our bodies
preserve temperature at 37°C whether we
reside at the equatororthe poles.All living
things maintain at least one disequilibrium
between their internal and external envi-
ronments. Viruses preserve the structure of
their genomes.
If life is what distinguishes animate
from inanimate matter, or, in other words,
what organisms lose at death, autonomous
homeostasis can seem anacceptable defin-
ition. Therearetwoproblems, however. First,
except forthe boundary across which dise-
quilibrium is preserved, animate and inan-
imate matter are identical.
"Taking living cells apart reveals that
theyare composed ofthe same elements as
inanimate matter, held together by the
same chemical bonds, interacting by the
same laws ofphysics" [8].
Homeostasis, therefore, has meaning
only in reference to a boundary. Failure to
detectaboundary wouldcauseus to identify
animatematteras inanimate. Imagineobserv-
ing ablood cell from within its membrane.
We would see water, salt, sugar, protein,
nucleic acid, lipid, etc., i.e., only inanimate
matter. We wouldn'tknowwhetherwewere
observing in vitro or in vivo biochemistry.
Only a comparison ofthe two sides ofthe
membrane would permit us to see one side
being maintained in disequilibrium with
the other. But that would require an extra-
cellular as well as an intracellular perspec-
tive. From within the membrane, we would
have no knowledge ofany boundary ordis-
equilibria, no inkling that cytoplasm was
in disequilibrium with plasma let alone
that plasma was in disequilibrium with its
environment. The lesson is clear: beforecall-
ing some collection of matter inanimate,
we needto verifythe absence ofaboundary
across whichsomememberofthatcollection
is preserved in disequilibrium. But that is
impossible.
Second, when we do observe disequi-
libriumacrossaboundary, wehaveto decide
which side of the boundary is alive. The
immediate answer is the autonomous side,
the side that is the cause ofthe disequilib-
rium Butwhichside isthat? Isthecytoplasm
alive because it generates the adenosine
triphosphate (ATP)bto movethe ions, oris
the plasma alive because it provides the
glucose to make the ATP? It can be diffi-
cult, ifnot impossible, to distinguish cause
from effect [31-33]. Perhaps the cytoplasm
and plasma together form an autonomous
homeostatic unit. Then the problem shifts
to ahigherlevelofcomplexity. Isthe multi-
celled organism alive because it generates
theATPto maintainvarious disequilibria, or
is its environment alivebecause itprovides
the nutrients to make theATP? Perhaps the
organismand its environmenttogether form
ahomeostatic unit. Thentheproblem shifts
to a still higher level ofcomplexity. Is the
Earth alive [34-35] because it maintains an
atmosphere in disequilibrium with its sur-
roundings, or is outer space alive because
itprovides the matterand energyto sustain
Earth [36]? Perhapstheuniverse isalive, sur-
roundedbyaboundaryofspace-time. Wecan
neverbecertainthatallboundarieshavebeen
detected orthat the cause ofdisequilibrium
across them has been properly assigned.
Social insects create communities that
act as superorganisms. Bees, for instance,
preserve hive temperature constant and in
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ment [37]. Termites preserve mound tem-
perature andatmosphere constant [37]. But
theboundaries ofthese superorganisms are
not defined by the hives and mounds, for
workers wander far and wide gathering
needed matter and energy. The boundaries
ofthese superorganisms, therefore, extend
to the diffuse limits ofthese wanderings.
"It is useful to think of an insect
colony as a diffuse organism" [38, p. 399].
But adiffuse boundary is made oftime and
space, and easily missed.
It is common to recognize time-space
boundaries within which the distribution
ofspecies is preserved constant and in dis-
equilibrium with the external environment
[39]. Rain forests and coral reefs are spec-
tacular examples, but all biomes are
boundedbytime and space [16]. We might
wonder which side ofthese boundaries is
autonomous, i.e., the cause ofthe disequi-
librim. Is itthepresence offood and habitat
on one side or the absence ofsuch on the
other, the absence ofpredators on one side
orthe presence ofsuch onthe other that is
the cause of the species disequilibrium?
Perhaps both sides ofthe boundary coop-
erate to make the biome and its surround-
ings a homeostatic unit. But then we have
simply expanded the boundary to include
thesurroundings. Whereverwechosetodraw
theboundarybetweenahomeostaticunitand
its surroundings, we are left withthe same
question: Which side of the boundary is
alive, i.e., autonomous. Which side ofthe
boundary isthecause ofthedisequilibrium?
Because ofthe inherent uncertainty in
ourabilityto detectboundaries ortoassign
cause to disequilibrium across them, we
can never be certain that we have identi-
fied inanimate matter. All we can say with
confidence regarding inanimate matter is
that we don't see autonomous homeosta-
sis. We can neverbe certainthat there isn't
any, particularly as most constituents of
animate matter are not homeostatic even
across theboundaries that we do recognize,
e.g.,membrane, skin,scale,baik, etc. Inplants
and cold-blooded animals, for instance,
internaltemperature approaches equilibrium
withthe surroundings. Yetthese organisms
are no less animate than warm-blooded
organisms. In red blood cells, sodium is
homeostatic whileglucoseisnot. Yet itisthe
cell,theentirecollection ofmatterwithinthe
membrane, that is recognized as animate,
notthe sodium.Andthere is nocritical num-
berofdisequilibriathat mustbemaintained
to qualify a package as animate. Even one
autonomous disequilibrium marks the entire
package ofmatteras animate.
"The entire range of living matter on
Earth, from whales to viruses, and from oak
to algae, could be regarded as constituting
a single living entity" [34].
"I have been trying to think of the
Earth as a kind oforganism, but it is no go
... Ifnot like an organism, what is it like,
what is it most like? Then, satisfactorily
for that moment, it came to me: It is most
like a single cell" [35].
If Thomas and Lovelock are correct,
inanimate matter doesn't exist on Earth.
We should wonder if it exists anywhere.
The dichotomy between animate and inan-
imate matter may be false, a failure either
to recognizedisequilibria, ortoassigncause
properly. We can imagine disequilibria
being maintainedacross space-timebound-
aries, andwe canimagine that suchbound-
aries encompass the universe [40-41]. For
these reasons, we cannot presume that any
matter is inanimate, and, since we cannot
define animate matter except incontrast to
inanimate matter, we are in danger ofcir-
cular reasoning: animate matter is what
manifests life and life is what is manifest-
edbyanimate matter. It is possible that the
present circumstances are too complicated
to dissect. Inthatcase, we might findrelief
by extrapolating to a simpler past.
I. The origin oflife
Fossil evidence suggests that organ-
isms first appeared on Earth some 3.8 bil-
lion years ago [42]. Scientists refer to this
event as the "origin of life" [12, 43-44].
But that begs the question on at least three318 Dix: What is life?
counts: first, evolution might be cyclic, in
which case what happened 3.8 billion
years ago wouldbe no more the originthan
what happened 10 billion years ago oryes-
terday. Second, life might be independent
oforganisms, e.g., a principle or force, in
which case organisms and life could have
different origins, as do eyes and light.
Third, all matter might be animate, in
which case, what happened 3.8 billion
years ago, would qualify only as the earliest
example ofaboundary across whichwe can
imagine disequilibrium being preserved.
Until we define life oranimate matter with-
out bias, it would be unscientific to close
our minds to any possibility. Unfortunately
the scientific discussions presume that life
is a product of matter, e.g., "Deep in the
seas, chemical processes were producing
life" [45, p. 74]. In fact it is impossible to
know iflife is the product or the cause of
animate behavior, or iflife exists indepen-
dently of animate matter, or even if ani-
mate matter differs from inanimate matter.
But notice howthe bias originates and
evolves: "There are twoways to define life.
The first is to saythat something is alive if
it has certain properties... Analternative is
to define as livinganypopulation ofentities
possessing those properties that are needed
if the population is to evolve by natural
selection" [46, p. 5]. Studies are then con-
ducted on "something" that is alive and
"populations ofentities" that are living. We
might even imagine howthe"something" or
the"populations" originated. But the adjec-
tives "alive" and "living" are neither syn-
onymous with, norable to modifythe noun
"life."Studiesontheseadjectives orthenouns
they can modify say nothing about life.
In quest of semantic precision, I sug-
gestwerefertothe eventsof3.8 billionyears
ago as the terrestrial origin ofconventional
organisms. One value in understanding
these events isthe possibility ofidentifying
the cause ofthe disequilibrium thatcharac-
terizesanimatematter. If, as currentthinking
suggests, conventional organisms originated
from so-called inanimate precursors [47],
the cause of the original disequilibrium
must be assigned to so-called inanimate
matter. But, forthereasonsmentionedabove,
we can neverbe certain that matter is inan-
imate. We are left with two possibilities:
either the power to create animate matter
resides in inanimate matter, or there is no
inanimate matter. Either way, the internal
homeostatic matter that is commonly rec-
ognized as animate is not the cause ofmat-
ter becoming animate. If in the course of
evolution this internal homeostatic matter
took on a causal role, the cause ofthat role
remains in the external environment. And
ifwe agree to call the cause ofhomeostasis
animate, the external environment is that.
If evolution is cyclic, there is no evi-
dence for a priorcycle having occurred on
Earth, and, since the planet is less than 1
billion years older than the organisms of
3.8 billion years ago, there isn't muchtime
for a prior cycle to have run its course.
Since the Sun will decay within 5 billion
years, there isn't much time for a subse-
quent cycle to run its course either [45].
Therefore, if evolution is cyclic, it must
also be extraterrestrial. It is noteworthy in
this regard that a cyclic model ofthe uni-
verse is as consistent withthe available data
as is a non-cyclic model [48].
Sagansuggestedthatbillions ofplanets
in our galaxy are inhabited [49]. But, he
wamed, that extraterrestrial organisms might
manifest life in ways "stunningly different"
from terrestrial biochemistry [49, p. 24],
and challenged us to imagine "what else is
possible?" I suggestadifferent calculation:
What are the odds that a unique form of
matter, i.e., animate, would appear only on
Earth and involve only that small minority
ofmatter that exists near its surface [16]?
Is it not more likely that all matter every-
where is ofthe same form andthat it is only
ourperceptionthat makes so-called animate
matter seem unique?
If Earth is alive, evolution may be
more accurately described as the subdivi-
sionofanimate matterinto more numerous,
intricate, and interconnectedpackages, intheDix: What is life? 319
mannerofearlyembryodevelopment, thanas
the successive appearance ofnew species.
1l. The quality oflife
The semantic imprecision surrounding
life has infected medicine, and is epito-
mized, perhaps, in standardized and "vali-
dated" questionnaires for assessing so-
called quality of life [24, 50]. These mea-
sure an individual's symptom distress,
daily living activity, support network, and
mental outlook, but they are not known to
have anything to do with life. Instead, they
summarize aperson's emotional state, their
sense ofhappiness or contentment. This is
closely related, ifnotidentical, to aperson's
individuality [51] and suggests that indi-
viduality is whatpeople generally meanby
"life." It is clearlywhat Korzeniewski means
by life [6].
What is individuality? It is the sense
ofbeing aunique and autonomous homeo-
static unit. On a fundamental level, indi-
viduality is defined by competition for
nutrients, habitat, and reproductive oppor-
tunity, and by immune tolerance [52-53].
On a more complicated level, it is defined
bynervous representation [54]. Individuality
encomiipasses the collection of a person's
peculiarities and is what we come to love.
It is what we lose at death, what we fear
losing, and what we mourn when lost. But
it isn't necessarily life. And ifit were life,
we should use"individuality" asasynonym,
for it has greaterprecision. But individuality
can't be life for patients with senility and
amnesia are recognized as having lost
individuality, not life: "He is, as it were,
isolated in a single moment ofbeing, with
a moat or lacuna of forgetting all round
him... He is man without apast (orfuture),
stuck in a constantly changing, meaning-
less moment" [55].
Individuality is based on the ability to
distinguish internal from extemal environ-
mentsandmaybe responsible forthe sense
ofconsciousness [54]. One fumction ofthis
sense is to scan the environment for items
ofinterest:
"Apredatory animal directed by inter-
nal conditions ofhungerscans the environ-
ment for the scent, sound or sight ofprey;
a runting animal scans forthe scent, sound
orsight ofamate. Once detected, the senses
focus and 'lock in' as the animal concen-
trates effort to trackits quarry. I assume that
scanning by the sense ofconsciousness is
directed similarly by conditions within the
organism and its environment... These
internal conditions, along with others in
the organism and inthe largerenvironment
direct the tracking process as the sense of
consciousness pursues its quarry" [56].
What is that quarry? I suggest it is
truth, i.e., that which does not change.
Laws ofnature give aglimpse oftruth. The
laws ofbuoyancy, gravity, electricity, ther-
modynamics, kinetics, genetics, nutrition,
and immunity, for example, are as valid
today as at the time oftheir discovery. It is
possible that the laws will require some
fine-tuning over time, particularly in the
manner oftheir interpretation and applica-
tion, but we have no experience ofany law
ever being suspended or overthrown. The
laws ofnature are our evidence forperma-
nence. They give credence to the theolo-
gians' argumentthat transient explanations
are inadequate.
The laws are invariant not only with
time, but also with individuality. They
apply to everyone equallyand, inthat way,
suggest that individuality is illusory.
Homeostatic units are never autonomous.
Individuality isn'tpermanent andtherefore
isn't true. We are all related. Everything is
interconnected. This is the great lesson of
ecology [16]. We are made ofstardust and
upon death become the dust from which
new stars are made [36, 49]. Iflife is true,
it cannot be the antonym of death.
Individuality is that. Life, to be true, must
be as immortal as the laws ofnature.
Self is like life in that it has various
meanings and no objective definition. To
scientists and some philosophers, it is syn-
onymous with individuality, i.e., a set of
organizational tools for "coherencing" the320 Dix: What is life?
brain's plans, decisions, and perceptions
[54]. To Hindus, Buddhists, and some
philosophers, self is permanent, spiritual,
and universal [57]. According to the for-
mer, hallucinogenic drugs and a variety of
brain lesions demonstrate that self is a
transient and disjointed concept. According
to the latter, the former miss the point.
Individuality is material and, therefore, not
true. Self is true and spiritual. Like buoy-
ancy, gravity, electricity, etc., the self is
invariant with time and individuality. We
cannot yet articulate the natural law ofself
consciousness, but we can extrapolate.
Six hundred years ago, there were
many tenable opinions on the shape ofour
planet and its position in the solar system,
on the nature ofmatter and energy, on the
causeofplague,consumption, scurvy,rickets,
and diabetes, etc. Now, on each of these
issues, there is only one tenable opinion.
As issues are settled objectively and infor-
mation disseminated, opinions converge.
We begin to think alike. In time, we will
think even more alike. And, as our con-
sciousness becomes more focused ontruth,
it becomes more permanent. The true self,
like the true buoyancyandthe truegravity,
must be the same for everyone over all
time [58]. Science isthe meanstotrue self-
consciousness.
CONCLUSION
What is life? It is impossible to say,
and, for that reason, should be defined as
broadly as possible so as not to exclude
anything reasonable. I suggest that life is
best considered as a process. At the
moment, life is the process by which mat-
ter and energy interact to form organisms
that then evolve to form conscious organ-
isms thatthen explore nature andeventual-
ly discovertruth. There is no otherword to
describe this long and convoluted process.
Life includes all the reactions and interac-
tions of matter and energy, as well as all
aspects of exploration and discovery, e.g.,
insight, ingenuity, creativity, endurance, and
luck. Because this process cannot yet be
quantitated, it isn't adequate as a defini-
tion. It does, however, capture the prereq-
uisites for a definition. It is free ofimplicit
assumptions, and immaterial and therefore
weightless. It animates the individual but
survives all individuals, and may even be
illusory. We can't say howthe process was
set inmotion, where it is headed, how long
it will continue, or what more might be
involved, and, for these reasons, life is
mysterious. But we can know this: on
occasion, life does provide a glimpse of
immortality.
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